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Abstract
This work seeks to explore the relationship between political corruption as defined by cases brought to the
United States Department of Justice against individuals holding public office from the fifty American states.
An comparative analysis of determined state-by-state corruptions rates and external factors such as the net
legislative salary in a given state, executive to legislative pay ratio (E/L ratio) in a given state, and the pay
determinant factor. A state-by-state analysis is done to determine correlation of these variables relative to their
corresponding corruption rates and the departure from average in those rates.
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 Uncovering the Roots of American Political Corruption:  An Analysis 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development defines the 
term political corruption to mean the misuse by government or political officials 
of their governmental powers and resources for illegitimate, usually secret, private 
gain (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010). Political 
corruption is no new issue in the world today; in fact, it can be said that 
corruption is one of the world’s oldest traditions, with evidence of the practice 
tracing back to ancient Rome and even beyond.  From an economic standpoint, 
corruption often leads to an inefficient economy with bribes and similar activities 
extracting the economic rents entirely, which leads to the misallocation of 
resources.  Resources are often misallocated due to rent seeking activities by 
producers in an economy (rarely do consumers organize a lobby) and a 
deadweight loss is created in the supply and demand function of the economy, and 
thus pushes it towards increased inefficiency.   
Rent seeking itself often translates into kickbacks and bribes for public 
officials holding the power to distribute the economic rents a particular policy 
proposition would create.  At the state level, corruption is often tied to an 
official’s favoritism toward a particular individual or firm.  The object of this 
perceived corruption often relates to an individual legislator’s relationship with a 
rent-seeking entity, which is not easily quantifiable.  However, corruption is also 
highly correlated with income level.  Alt and Lassen (2008) cited that in the US 
states over 25 years, empirical data shows that higher government relative wages 
significantly and robustly produces less corruption.  Thus, it can be postulated that 
state legislators who have a lower government salary relative to their cost of 
living at a particular locale will exhibit more frequent incidents of corruption.   
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 So, at a higher relative wage, a public official will be less likely to 
undertake a corrupt act than at a lower relative wage.  This is a function of a gain 
share in capital (the value of the corrupt act to the official) but also of the political 
and legal risk associated with undertaking such an act.  As common sense would 
provide, an official would be more likely to be a party to a corrupt act if the net 
gain of participating is high, and less likely as the net gain decreases.  Also, at a 
lower relative wage rate, a public official is more likely to be willing to take the 
risk for undertaking a corrupt act than at a comparably higher relative wage.  In 
simple laymen’s terms, a legislator who stands to lose more in a given transaction 
labeled as being politically corrupt will be less likely to do so, and will only do so 
if the benefit gained from the corrupt act is significantly more than the risk. 
 This above stated hypothesis can be proven with empirical data collected 
from a national state-specific survey of current legislative salaries.  This paper 
expounds upon the findings in Alt and Landess (2008) and seeks to explore 
further the notion of sourcing political corruption.  Also, examining the corruption 
rates by state in relation to both executive/legislative pay ratios and whether 
legislative salaries are set by statute or by the state’s Constitution will be explored 
in this analysis.  Corruption rates, as defined in this abstraction, can be modeled 
as the following function: 
Corruption (%) = ƒ(legislative salary + E/L ratio + pay determinant) 
 
The function above can be further explained: where “Corruption (%)” is 
defined as the number of Department of Justice cases in each state from 1997-
2006 set against state population data and a percentage rate is calculated per 
100,000 residents.  The terms “corruption %” and “corruption rate” may be used 
interchangeably.  Legislative salary is defined as the gross income of an 
individual legislator in a given state as it compares to the national average for 
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 legislator compensation.  E/L ratio represents the ratio of the compensation of the 
state’s chief executive (governor) to the compensation of a legislator in the same 
given state.  The pay determinant factor is simply a finding on the method by 
which a given legislator’s salary is set – whether by statute or state Constitution. 
The corruption rates among states vary widely amongst the data set 
derived from a 2006 Department of Justice report on the number of individual 
corruption cases prosecuted at the federal level from 1997-2006.  North Dakota 
has the highest corruption rate in this data set at 8.25 percent, while Oregon has 
the lowest at .68 percent.  The mean corruption rate for all fifty states extrapolated 
from this data set is 3.15 percent, and nineteen states had a corruption rate of 
greater than or equal to this number.  It must be noted that this Department of 
Justice report is not all inclusive of all indictments alleging corruption; it simply 
lists all indictments made by the Department of Justice against state officials, 
which accounts for slightly more than 80 percent of corruption indictments 
(USDOJ, 2006).   
The second function term, the ratio of executive to legislative pay, also has 
a wide variance. The highest ratio is found in New Mexico at 17.21, which 
suggests that the governor of that state has a salary that is 17.21 times that of an 
individual legislator in the same state.  The lowest is found in California at 1.40, 
which suggests that the governor of California has a salary that is 1.4 times that of 
an individual legislator in California.  The average executive to legislative pay 
ratio (E/L ratio) is 4.87, which implies that the chief executive of the average state 
earns 4.87 times that of a single legislator in the same state. 
The findings of this data set advocate that the average salary of a state’s 
chief executive (governor) across all fifty states is $124,396 for the fiscal year 
2007, while the average legislator earns $36,005 in 2007.  It is important to note, 
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 however, that most legislatures do not operate on a full-time basis, and are 
compensated as such.  The average legislative session across the country is 88 
days, and salaries of individual state legislators from given states are calculated 
from their compensation data computed against their legislative session dates.  
Most state legislators, as a result of this data, are part-time state officials and most 
likely hold external positions in their home districts during states’ legislative 
recesses.  State chief executives, on the other hand, operate as full-time state 
officials.  This mean salary data above is used to extrapolate a general conclusion 
on the average pay for state legislators and state chief executives for computing 
E/L ratios for individual states. 
First, there is no disputing the empirical data set forth in Alt and Landess 
(2008), which cites that in the US states over 25 years, data shows that higher 
government relative wages significantly and robustly produces less corruption.  
This holds true in the data set used for the findings in this paper regarding the 
compensation for individual state legislators.  Nineteen states out of the fifty US 
States, some 38 percent, have an above average (3.15%) corruption rate per the 
data synthesized from the Department of Justice from 1997-2006.  Of these 
nineteen states, 73.6 percent have a legislative salary that is below the average 
legislative compensation across the fifty states.  That is, fourteen states with 
above-average corruption rates also have their legislative salaries below the 
$36,005 average, assuming a $5,000 margin on either side. 
Hence, it can be said that across state legislatures, a higher level of 
compensation in regard to individual state legislators seemingly deters higher than 
average levels of corruption in those states 73.6 percent of the time.  Only five 
states with above mean legislative salaries also had above mean corruption rates, 
which makes up a mere 26.4 percent of the total data set.  This is consistent with 
Alt and Landess’ (2008) conclusion and extends their hypothesis to apply to 
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 individual state legislative bodies.  Ceteris paribus conditions in this part of the 
analysis include: income per capita found in individual states, income tax rates in 
individual states, and state revenue differences among separate states.   
The conclusion of this component of the function ƒ regarding corruption 
rates in a given state as a percent is negatively correlated with legislative salary in 
the same given state.  Thus, as an individual state’s corruption rate grows relative 
to average, one would expect for its legislative salary to be lower relative to 
average.  This finding holds that states with above-mean corruption rates are 
much more likely to have a legislative salary that is below the national average, to 
an extent of nearly 3:1. 
Next, the novel component of this particular analysis is examined.  The 
function postulates that in addition to legislative salary playing a distinct role in 
determining statewide corruption rates, the ratio of executive to legislative pay 
(E/L ratio) is also important.  This regression finds that of the nineteen states that 
have a rate of corruption that is above the mean (3.15%), 63 percent have an E/L 
ratio of below the mean (4.87) across the fifty states.  As a function of the 
percentage, twelve states of the nineteen with above average corruption rates have 
an E/L ratio of below 4.87 – a statistically significant portion.  Only six states, or 
37 percent, had an E/L ratio of greater than or equal to the national average. 
From this result, it can be extrapolated that low E/L ratios and greater 
parity between the salaries of state chief executives and individual legislators does 
not deter corruption, in fact, the opposite is true.  These findings imply that a 
lower E/L ratio in a given state set against a national average does not deter 
above-average corruption rates in the same given state 63 percent of the time.  
E/L ratios with regards to departure from mean ratios actually have a positive 
correlation when set against corruption rates in comparison to national averages.  
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 Consequently, it can be said that as a state’s corruption rate increases relative to 
average, one could expect that the same state’s executive to legislative 
compensation ratio to increase relative to average.  According to the data, this 
hypothesis holds true at a rate of more than 2:1. 
The last element of the modeled function of corruption explores how 
individual states determine the compensation for legislators.  Using data extracted 
from the Book of the States (2009), states set their legislative compensation via 
statute or by commission from the state constitution.  A simple analysis results in 
a finding that 38 percent of states set their legislative compensation through 
commission by their state Constitution.  Thirty one states, conversely, set their 
legislative compensation by state statute.  It must be noted that most of these 
states whose legislative salary is set by statute stipulate that salary changes may 
not take effect until the following session, normally after an election.  There are 
no stipulations, however, governing those state legislators who gain re-election 
from their districts. 
This analysis finds that of the states with above average corruption rates 
(3.15%), 68.4 percent of those states set their legislative salaries by statute.  
Consequently, thirteen of the nineteen states with above mean corruption rates 
have their legislative compensation set by state statute.  Only six of those same 
nineteen states set their legislative salaries by state Constitution, amassing only 
31.6 percent of the total data set.  This finding implies that states with above-
mean rates of corruption, those same states are much more likely to have a 
statutory method of determining legislative compensation, on a scale of more than 
2:1.  Conversely, one can expect that as a state’s corruption rate increases relative 
to average, the same state is more likely to have a method of setting its legislative 
compensation by statute, on the order of more than 2:1.  With regard to the 
model’s determinant function, the method of setting state legislator pay by statute 
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 has a significant positive correlation when compared with corruption rates and 
their relative departures from the national average. 
The overall result of a regression of this data set is conclusive and 
supports previous data while also expounding on new findings.  An analysis the 
level of corruption relative to average in the fifty US states results in a finding of 
nineteen states with above mean corruption rates, or rates greater than 3.15 
percent per 100,000 population.  Of those nineteen states, 73.6 percent have a 
legislative salary below the national average, 63 percent have an E/L ratio below 
the national average, and 68.4 percent set their legislative compensation by state 
statute.   
Accordingly, it can be determined that as corruption rates increase relative 
to average in a given state, the state will have a legislative salary that is below 
average at a nearly 3:1 rate, an E/L ratio below mean at a more than 2:1 rate, and 
will set its legislative compensation by statute at a more than 2:1 rate.  The data 
set suggests that higher corruption rates in regard to departure from the national 
average negatively correlate with legislative salaries; as corruption rates increase 
relative to the mean, one can expect the legislative salary in that state to be lower 
relative to the national average in the same state.  Furthermore, as corruption rates 
increase relative to the mean, the executive to legislative compensation ratio (E/L 
ratio) will increase with regard to the national average; these data findings are 
positively correlated.  Further still, as corruption rates in individual states increase 
with regard to the average, we find that these states are more likely to use a 
statutory method of determining their legislative compensation. 
As a baseline determinant for states’ contributions to their own corruption 
rates, it can be expected that states must increase their salaries relative to average 
to deter increased rates of corruption.  However, as individual states increase their 
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 relative salaries, the average salary will inevitably increase, leading to a 
continuum of recurring higher-than-average corruption rates until a threshold is 
reached.  Higher relative wage rates amongst state legislators leads to an increase 
in the perceived risk of committing a politically corrupt act, and thus, these 
legislators will commit less as a percentage of politically corrupt acts at a higher 
wage rate as a response to risk aversion.  Thus, in parity with Alt and Landess 
(2008), lower legislative salaries relative to average produce more corruption, on 
a level of nearly 3:1. 
Moreover, a lower E/L ratio in a given state seems to not only fail to avert 
higher than average levels of corruption, it seems to positively correlate with it.  
An E/L ratio in a given state that is below the national average seems to 
contribute more to the risk of the same state experiencing a higher than average 
corruption rate amongst its state officials.  Comparable to other states, a state with 
an E/L ratio below the mean is twice as likely to have a corruption rate that is 
higher than the national mean. 
Last, the method by which states set their legislative compensation has a 
significant impact on the rate of political corruption in that state.  This finding is 
proven by the above data set, and it suggests that states whose method of 
legislative compensation is by state Constitution on average have much less risk 
with regard to the state experiencing higher than mean corruption rates.  Thus, a 
legislative salary set by statute in a given state produces significantly more 
corruption.  This is true to the extent that comparable to the national average, a 
state with a statutory method of determining legislative compensation is twice as 
likely to have a corruption rate that is higher than the national average. 
These findings do not support absolute causation of any of the factors, but 
more of an increase in the risk of a state experiencing higher than average 
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 corruption rates.  States that have a legislative salary set below the national 
average, a below average E/L ratio, and a state statute that determines their 
legislative pay are at an increased risk for above average political corruption.  The 
combination of the above factors play a role in determining the relative levels of 
corruption in the US States with regard to these factors as a function of the 
corruption rate (%) in any given state. 
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 Appendix 1a:  Salaries for individual legislators in given 
states and salaries of chief executives (Governors) of given 
states in 2007. 
 
State 
Legislative Salary 
(2007) Executive Salary (2007) 
 
 
Alabama  $     10,200.00   $  112,895.00  
Alaska  $     33,615.00   $  125,000.00  
Arizona  $     26,525.00   $    95,000.00  
Arkansas  $     25,165.00   $    80,848.00  
California  $   146,470.00   $  206,500.00  
Colorado  $     38,514.00   $    90,000.00  
Connecticut  $     28,000.00   $  150,000.00  
Delaware  $     42,000.00   $  132,500.00  
Florida  $     37,170.00   $  132,932.00  
Georgia  $     27,895.00   $  135,281.00  
Hawaii  $     40,970.00   $  112,000.00  
Idaho  $     23,383.00   $  105,560.00  
Illinois  $     90,244.00   $  155,600.00  
Indiana  $     22,697.00   $    95,000.00  
Iowa  $     32,743.00   $  130,000.00  
Kansas  $     19,115.00   $  105,889.00  
Kentucky  $     16,787.00   $  137,506.00  
Louisiana  $     22,872.00   $    95,000.00  
Maine  $     22,443.00   $    70,000.00  
Maryland  $     53,862.00   $  150,000.00  
Massachusetts  $     72,592.00   $  140,535.00  
Michigan  $     91,650.00   $  177,000.00  
Minnesota  $     39,357.00   $  120,203.00  
Mississippi  $     19,737.00   $  122,160.00  
Missouri  $     39,508.00   $  120,087.00  
Montana  $     14,876.00   $    96,462.00  
Nebraska  $     19,107.00   $  105,000.00  
Nevada  $     11,445.00   $  141,000.00  
New Hampshire  $          100.00   $  108,990.00  
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 New Jersey  $     49,000.00   $  175,000.00  
New Mexico  $       6,390.00   $  110,000.00  
New York  $     79,500.00   $  179,000.00  
North Carolina  $     31,119.00   $  130,629.00  
North Dakota  $     13,175.00   $    92,483.00  
Ohio  $     58,933.00   $  144,830.00  
Oklahoma  $     48,526.00   $  140,000.00  
Oregon  $     30,387.00   $    93,600.00  
Pennsylvania  $   107,282.00   $  164,396.00  
Rhode Island  $     13,089.00   $  117,817.00  
South Carolina  $     23,609.00   $  106,078.00  
South Dakota  $     12,050.00   $  105,544.00  
Tennessee  $     35,412.00   $    85,000.00  
Texas  $     21,100.00   $  115,345.00  
Utah  $       9,316.00   $  104,100.00  
Vermont  $     23,064.00   $  143,957.00  
Virginia  $     22,495.00   $  175,000.00  
Washington  $     43,061.00   $  150,995.00  
West Virginia  $     24,200.00   $    95,000.00  
Wisconsin  $     70,381.00   $  137,092.00  
Wyoming  $       9,165.00   $  105,000.00  
 
 
Average  $     36,005.92   $  124,396.28  
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 Appendix 1b:  Executive to Legislative Salary Ratio (E/L Ratio) 
calculated using data from Appendix 1a.  Corruption rate is based on 
the number of individual corruption cases prosecuted at the federal 
level from 1997-2006 in a given state set against its 2007 population. 
 
State E/L Ratio1 Corruption Rate (Per 100,000)2 
 
 
Alabama 11.068 4.76 
Alaska 3.718 5.82 
Arizona 3.581 1.88 
Arkansas 3.212 2.74 
California 1.409 2.07 
Colorado 2.336 1.56 
Connecticut 5.357 2.8 
Delaware 3.154 4.7 
Florida 3.576 4.47 
Georgia 4.849 2.13 
Hawaii 2.733 4.21 
Idaho 4.514 2.73 
Illinois 1.724 4.68 
Indiana 4.185 1.85 
Iowa 3.97 0.91 
Kansas 5.539 1.41 
Kentucky 8.192 5.18 
Louisiana 4.153 7.67 
Maine 3.119 1.89 
Maryland 2.784 2.31 
Massachusetts 1.935 2.66 
Michigan 1.931 2.14 
Minnesota 3.056 1.24 
Mississippi 6.189 6.66 
Missouri 3.039 2.79 
Montana 6.484 6.38 
Nebraska 5.495 0.73 
Nevada 12.319 1.72 
New Hampshire 0 1.06 
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 New Jersey 3.571 4.32 
New Mexico 17.214 1.38 
New York 2.251 3.95 
North Carolina 4.197 1.96 
North Dakota 7.019 8.25 
Ohio 2.457 4.69 
Oklahoma 2.885 2.96 
Oregon 3.08 0.68 
Pennsylvania 1.532 4.55 
Rhode Island 9.001 2.54 
South Carolina 4.493 1.74 
South Dakota 8.758 5.64 
Tennessee 2.4 3.68 
Texas 5.466 2.44 
Utah 11.174 1.41 
Vermont 6.241 1.935 
Virginia 7.779 3.64 
Washington 3.506 1.52 
West Virginia 3.925 4.14 
Wisconsin 1.947 2.09 
Wyoming 11.456 3.13 
 
 
Average 4.87946 3.1559 
 
1 Calculated using data from Appendix 1a. 
2 Rates are calculated based on the number of corruption cases per 100,000 residents in a given 
state. 
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